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PART A: Forced by operational inefficiencies in its own business model, CHEP, the market leader in the rental pallet
business, became an early adopter of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. Having proven the
effectiveness of the technology for internal operations with a pilot test, CHEP now had to find clients who want to
adopt the technology-enabled services in order to pay for a large scale roll out.
The case traces CHEP’s challenges associated with the development and deployment RFID in its own operation
and raises questions of how to proceed with potential IT-enabled change at the enterprise and supply chain level,
without spoiling relationships with current clients and maintaining its core business.
PART B: In fall 2007, Brian Beattie and Puneet Sawhney looked back at CHEP’s RFID initiative and the progress
that has been made since the 2003 decision to further incorporate the technology into its assets. While the original
intent of tagging all pallets did not materialize, considerable progress had been made into quantifying the benefits of
RFID adoption. Industry-wide developments had changed the scope of the RFID initiative from simply tagging the
asset pool to creating value added service for CHEP’s clients. Overall, RFID had yet to revolutionize the supply
chain, but the evolution of technology and the innovation of RFID related products and services had aided CHEP in
maintaining its market leadership in the pallet business and enabled CHEP to created new lines of business.
Keywords: IT-enabled change, RFID, organizational value chain, technology adoption, IS investment, product and
service innovation, asset tracking
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PART A: INTRODUCTION12
In the early 2000s the major retail chains moved beyond the boundaries of the enterprise to further improve their
operations. One particular focus of companies such as Wal-Mart, Tesco, and Metro was the optimization of the
entire supply chain. While Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) had connected supply chains a decade earlier, the
quality and accuracy of the information shared was by no means satisfactory. The emergence of Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) provided the technology needed to capture accurate and timely item-level data, information that
was deemed crucial to optimize the product and information flow throughout entire supply chain.
CHEP, the leading provider of rental pallets in the U.S. was both an integral part of most major supply chain
operations and an early adopter of RFID. Having invested more than $20 million in the research and development of
RFID enabled pallets, the CHEP management was under increasing pressure by its parent company to monetize on
its innovations beyond efficiency gains in its internal operations.
By championing RFID, CHEP had put itself in the position to enable change on the enterprise, supply change and
industry level. However, inducing technology enabled change while at the same time maintaining a profitable core
business posed a unique challenge for CHEP. Unsure of how to best market the new technology to clients and
partners, CHEP had to decide whether they just want to offer enhanced RFID pallets for its clients, or to become a
supply chain wide information broker.

I. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
A pallet is a platform, usually made of wood and assembled with metal nails. Typically, goods move in commerce
from their manufacturer to distributors, to wholesalers, and finally to retailers, where they are made available for
purchase by the consumer. Wooden pallets are used for purposes of hauling, loading and unloading, and storing the
goods. The wooden pallet has traditionally been the basis for the design of storage racks, warehouse storage areas,
forklifts, docks and containers used in shipping goods. It is estimated by industry sources that on average there are
more than seven pallets for each person in the United States. According to a survey conducted by the National
Wooden Pallet and Container Association, 91 percent of pallet users reported using wood pallets, with the remainder
being made from other materials such as steel, plastic, or cardboard [Maloney 2000].
By 2003, the U.S. pallet industry generated revenues of approximately $6 billion, and it was served by approximately
3,600 companies, most of which were small, privately held entities. These companies were generally operating in
only one location and serving customers within a limited geographic region. The industry was generally composed of
companies that manufacture new pallets and companies that repair and recycle pallets. The U.S. Forest Service
estimated that 475 million new wood pallets are produced annually, 300 million wood pallets were repaired and sent
back into circulation, and 175 million wood pallets were sent to landfills [Bush and Araman 1998].
The pallet industry, a generally mature industry, had experienced significant changes during the 1990s. These
changes were due, among other factors, to the focus by Fortune 1000 businesses on improving the efficiency of
their supply chains, manufacturing, and distribution systems. This focus had caused many of these businesses to
significantly the number of vendors serving them to simplify their procurement and product distribution processes.
Palletized freight facilitated movement through the supply chain reduced costly loading and unloading delays at
distribution centers. As a result, there had been an increased demand for high-quality pallets which decreased the
cost per trip by reducing product damage during shipment and storage and by increasing the number of trips for
which pallets can be used. Moreover, environmental and cost concerns had also accelerated the trend toward
increased reuse or "recycling" of pallets and certain other transport packing materials, further emphasizing the
importance of the quality of newly manufactured pallets.
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Shipping companies had a variety of options for procuring pallets. Traditionally, companies would buy the pallets,
load the goods, and send them to their clients. Depending upon the size and make-up of the operations, businesses
would decide whether to opt for single-use, lower-quality pallets that are not returned by the customers or for higher
quality, reusable pallets, where the return processes would need to be arranged with the customers. The
administrative, operational and logistical costs associated with managing the pallets, led to the emergence of thirdparty providers that started to lease out high-quality pallets and offer management of the associated logistics. In the
outsourced rental model, shippers paid a combination usage and transfer fees that usually amounted to total trip
costs ($5-$8) that are below the purchase price of a one-way pallet ($10).
By 2003, more than 10 percent of the 2 billion pallets that were in circulation in the U.S. were provided by pallet
leasing or pooling companies. While the asset share in the overall market was fairly small, the pooling and leasing of
the pallets was a highly profitable business. The major pallets pooling providers generated close to $2 billion in
annual revenue and were expected to grow both their market share and revenue in the future.

II. COMPETETIVE LANDSCAPE
In the U.S., pallet pooling was a fairly novel business model with few national providers and some regional
providers. By 2003, approximately 200 million pallets in circulation were multi-use rental pallets. In 1990 CHEP
entered the U.S. market as the first provider with a national distribution network in the U.S. Throughout the
consolidation of the pallet industry in the 1990s a number of companies entered and exited the pallet pooling
business. Between 1990 and 1996 companies such as First National Rental, Pallet Pallet and the Canadian Pallet
council tried unsuccessfully to establish a pallet rental program in the U.S. The most common issue for the
companies was the fairly small size of their pallet pool as well as low distribution center density, which increased the
cost of shipping pallets. In 1997, PECO, a consortium of 12 pallet companies, was the first company to develop a
rental system that could compete with CHEP’s. Focusing on the grocery industry, PECO management decided to
work with only a few clients and a competitively small pallet pool of 2 million. The strategy worked, and by 1999
PECO became the second largest rental provider in the U.S. Besides the two market leaders, only regional
companies such as Kamps Pallets in Michigan were able to make the pallet pooling model work. Moreover, there
were several attempts to introduce plastic pallet pooling models as a more environmentally friendly alternative to
wooden pallets. However, the higher manufacturing costs and the resistance of industry organizations to adopt
plastic pallets as a standard led to a quick demise of those efforts.
By 2003, CHEP was the undisputed market leader in the U.S., at situation which mirrored the developments of most
of the countries where CHEP operated in. Being the pioneer of the pallet pool-leasing model, CHEP was the market
share leader in 90 percent of the 42 countries that it operated in.

III. COMPANY BACKGROUND
The Commonwealth Handling Equipment Pool (CHEP) evolved from the Allied Materials Handling Standing
Committee, an organization developed by the Australian government to provide efficient handling of defense
supplies during World War II. In 1949, the government decided to privatize the industry and mandated the sale of the
CHEP organization. Among CHEP’s core assets were vast amounts of pallets, forklifts, and cranes left by the allied
forces.
Brambles, a company created in 1875, had significant experience in the materials handling industry, acquired CHEP
in 1958. The acquisition of CHEP empowered Brambles with new core competencies making it ready to meet the
constantly growing demands of the materials-handling industry. In particular, Brambles was interested in exploiting
the large pool of pallets and containers, and taking advantage of the scale that this pool of platforms provided.
Within a few years CHEP, leased out and operated the largest pool of pallets and containers in the southern
hemisphere and the largest hiring fleet of forklift trucks in Australia. With the acquisition of the British firm GKN,
CHEP set up a UK branch in 1974, followed by CHEP Canada in 1980, and CHEP USA in 1990.
By 2003, CHEP was the global leader in pallet and plastic container pooling services, supporting many of the world’s
largest companies. With its global headquarters located in Orlando, Florida, CHEP employed more than 7,500
employees in 42 countries at more than 500 service centers. On a global scale, the company generated
approximately $US 3 billion in revenue by pooling more than 200 million pallets and more than 40 million containers
worldwide. In 2003, CHEP served more than 75,000 consumer good manufacturers and produce growers
(manufacturers) and 225,000 wholesalers and retailers (distributors).

IV. BUSINESS MODEL
By issuing, collecting, conditioning, and reissuing pallets and containers from its service centers, CHEP supported
manufacturers and growers to transport their products to distributors and retailers. Drawing from a pool of over 100
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million pallets and containers, CHEP was only one of two pooling companies that distributed and collected its pallets
across the entire U.S. Pallets accounted for nearly 90 percent of CHEP’s pooling business.
CHEP leased high quality, standardized and easily identifiable (all CHEP pallets are painted blue) 48" by 40" pallets.
The pallets were designed for multiple uses. Deploying high-quality softwood and reinforcing design, the pallets
weighed 60 lbs. and could hold up to 2,800 lbs. of goods. In comparison, a standard pallet was 15 lbs. lighter and
could only carry up to 1500 lbs. With an average of $20 of procurement cost, the CHEP pallets were also twice as
expensive as the regular single-use pallets. By using CHEP’s pallets, clients had reduced transportation costs and
reduced product damage due to more stable storage arrangements which would prevent weight shifts of the loaded
goods. Moreover, softwood pallets were less likely to break when mishandled during transportation, loading and
unloading. With higher payloads per pallet, transporters could improve vehicle utilization and provide faster
turnaround times. Moreover, through the standardized design of the pallets, products could be unloaded faster and
safer. In addition, the reusability of the CHEP pallets reduced disposal expenses at land fills.
CHEP’s asset flow model was designed for closed-loop systems, where all supply-chain links are in a contractual
relationship with CHEP. Initially, pallets were issued to manufacturers that could subsequently load goods onto the
pallets. During this step, CHEP would charge the manufacturer an issue fee, which was related to the transport of
the pallets from CHEP’s service centers to the manufacturer’s location, and a hire fee based on the days that the
pallets were in the manufacturer’s possession. When the loaded pallets were shipped to the distributors, CHEP
charged a transfer fee to the distributors. The distributors then had to pay a daily hire fee while they used the pallets
and a recollection fee upon returning the pallets. Ideally, CHEP would collect all fees from the parties involved and
receive all of its pallets at the service center, where pallets were sorted (A), refurbished if necessary (B), and
reissued (C).3
On average, a pallet trip through the closed loop took 44 days. It was estimated that CHEP charges a total of $5 to
$6 in fees per pallet for an average trip.4 Since it charged a variety of variable and fixed fees from different clients,
CHEP had tremendous administrative cost associated with billing the correct amount to each partner. Moreover,
CHEP heavily depended on inventory reports by the clients (which are seldom verified) and random sampling to
assess the correct fees.

Figure 1. Asset Flow and Pricing Model
3

4

The closed-loop asset flow is depicted in the shaded area of Figure 1.
The financial data in this section were derived from public records and interviews with CHEP management.
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In the original closed-loop model, CHEP had contract relations will all participating parties. In the past, CHEP had a
fairly good record of tracking the pallets and billing the clients. However, with the rise of contracts and the growth in
scale, pallets frequently were shipped outside of the network, making it impossible for CHEP to track pallets and
enforce their return to the service centers. CHEP introduced several charges and penalties for its clients to limit
pallets moving outside the closed-loop system. In 1998, it introduced surcharges ranging between $3.50 and $8.00
for preferred manufacturers that would ship pallets to so called Non-Participating distributors (NPD), which had no
contractual obligation to return pallets to CHEP. All non-preferred clients that could not return all pallets, because
they were shipped outside of the CHEP network, were charged a “lost equipment fee” ranging from $20 to $24.
However, it was CHEP’s burden to prove that (a) the pallets had actually left the closed loop, and (b) which party
was responsible for the leakage and eventual loss of the pallets.
By September 2002, CHEP reported that nearly 10 million pallets were leaked outside of the closed loop. About 3
million pallets could be tracked to known NPDs that had no obligation to return the pallets to CHEP. The other 7
million pallets were lost to out of network parties such as pallet recyclers or end-users who were hesitant to return
the pallets or not aware that the blue pallets were rental property rather then part of the purchased goods. If CHEP
could not collect those pallets, it would have to pay up to $21 per pallet for replacements or face losing annual
revenue of $9 to $13 per pallet.
As an initial response, CHEP collaborated with a substantial number of out-of-network parties as part of their Asset
Recovery Program and raised the awards for returned pallets. Moreover, a budget of $20 million was set aside for
activities to recover and collect lost pallets. However, trying to recover lost pallets was merely a short-term solution
of the symptoms rather than a long-term cure of for lack of traceability of and accountability for the pallets.

V. DISCOVERING THE POTENTIAL OF RFID 5
In the mid 1990s, CHEP began to explore ways to improve asset tracking and customer service. At the time, the
most common form of product identification was Universal Product Code (UPC), more commonly know as bar
codes. Since their introduction in as a standard retail identifier in the mid 1970s, bar codes had risen to ubiquity.
Virtually every product sold in the U.S. had a UPC symbol consisting of a human-readable 12-digit UPC number and
a machine-readable bar code. The first six digits are a unique manufacturer identification number that is assigned by
the Uniform Code Council (UCC). The next five digits were the product code that uniquely identifies product groups
and packaging size. The last digit presented a check digit that verifies the integrity of the previous 11 digits.
The bar codes enabled to major innovations in the retail industry. First, items could now be identified and associated
with a through a unique 12-digit number. Second, and more importantly, the machine-readability enabled semiautomated scanning, which improved the speed and accuracy of taking inventory or checking out at cash registers.
The improved data quality also enabled retailers to analyze their sales and to track marketing efforts.
Despite the ubiquity of UPC and the success of related analyses applications, there were many settings and
circumstances where barcodes were simply not a feasible solution to identifying and tracking items. The scanning of
barcodes usually required a person that would either hold the item in front of a scanner or alternatively point the
scanner directly at the bar code. For a successful scan, a proper reading angle, a fairly short distance (max. 2 feet)
and a line of sight were necessary. Moreover, only one item at a time could be scanned, which incurred large lead
times for sizable inventories.
For CHEP’s purpose of tracking millions of individual pallets, bar codes were inadequate because most stacked
pallets were outside of the reading distance or hidden behind other pallets. Moreover, the labor required to scan
individual pallets at different location was enormous. Looking for alternative tracking technologies, CHEP
management soon took note of the formation of the Auto ID Center and joined it as one of its first sponsors. In 1998,
the Uniform Code Council, Gillette and Procter & Gamble teamed up with MIT to create the Auto ID center. The
mission of the Auto ID was do develop and deploy technologies that would replace the UPC bar code. The center
soon focused on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) as an appropriate technology for replacing bar codes.
As a technology, RFID can be traced back to the 1930s. During the World War II, British planes would carry a
transmitter, that when exited by radar waves, would broadcast a signal, identifying them as friendly aircrafts to the
Allied radar station. RFID worked on the same basic concept: A tag, when exited by a radio wave sent by an
external source, will reflect a slightly different signal back to the source. Based on the reflected signal, the source (or
reader) can then identify tag.

5
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Volume 22

Article 26

489

A passive RFID tag could store 96 bit of information, allowing for a nearly infinite number of different Electronic
Product Codes to be assigned. Thus, every tag and every associated item could be uniquely identified. In theory, a
passive tag could be read from up to 10 feet away and no immediate line of sight was required for a successful read.
More importantly, multiple tag readings were possible with a single scan. Thus, with the exception of water or metal
blocking the radio waves, contents of entire warehouses could be read by simply walking or driving along the
products, using a mobile reader.
However, by 1999 the technology’s theoretical capabilities were not tested outside of a lab environment. Moreover,
aside from prototypes, there were no commercial tags and readers available that would make a large scale
implementation feasible. Thus, the CHEP management decided to become involved in the Auto ID imitative. CHEP
agreed to provide the pallets fitted with RFID tags for potential field trials. The agreement was a big commitment,
especially for a company that did not have experience with the emerging technology.
At the time, the choice of auto-identification technology was relatively easy, since only one company provided tags
that were powerful enough to be read through common dock doors. The first challenge was to attach the tag to the
wooden pallets. Tags could not be attached underneath the pallet because glue would not properly adhere to the
wood. The option of affixing the tags to the top of the pallet was soon discarded since the tags would be exposed to
constant wear through loading and unloading. The possibility of placing the tag inside the wood was also not
feasible, since the material would partially block the transmission of the RF signal. With the lack of technological
alternatives, CHEP engineers decided to attach a plastic board to the pallets where tags could be attached. This
design worked until the pallets were loaded with products containing water or metal that interfered with the proper
transmission of the RFID signal. The only technically feasible solution, a two-tag solution, could be implemented but
was too expensive for a large-scale rollout.
Over the course of the next two years, the supply of RFID technology became abundant. Not satisfied with the
outcome of the first prototype, CHEP started testing products from more then 30 technology vendors under various
conditions. A team attached tags to different spots on the pallets and drove the pallets through a portal with
readers.6 The team tested the tags in environmental chambers that brought the temperature down to -20 degrees
Fahrenheit or up to 140 degrees. Moreover, they emulated real-world conditions by putting tagged pallets on a
machine that simulated the vibration of trucks and by intentionally dropping containers to guarantee the performance
of the RFID system in the field. In the end, an angled tag, attached to the center block of the pallet, proved to be
best design. The design fulfilled the stringent reading requirements while at the same time minimizing exposure to
damage. 7
By 2001, CHEP’s RFID team had become expert in RFID implementation. EPCglobal, the successor of the Auto-ID
center, adopted CHEP’s readability and testing requirements as the official standard. In addition, formal and informal
links into the standard development community were established that helped CHEP to shape the future of the RFID
technology. However, there were no immediate returns on investment from the RFID-related research. RFID was
still not implemented to solve CHEP’s operational problems, and research expenses started to accumulate. By the
end of 2001, the future of the project was in doubt. Fortunately, for the project, a new CEO was appointed in
February 2002. Victor Mendes immediately saw the value of RFID, but he also was worried about the slow progress.
He decided that the technology had to be implemented immediately instead of further testing it in controlled
environments.

The Pilot
Donna Slyster, senior VP of operations, was put in charge of a team that included people from CHEP's IT,
engineering, operations, and asset management departments. Having worked at EDS and General Motors, she was
familiar with the implementation of new technologies. In order to have tight control over the pilot operations, Slyster
decided to roll out the pilot close to the Florida headquarters. The team tagged 250,000 pallets with the aim of
tracking them as they moved among 34 manufacturer locations and back to any of the six Florida service centers.
The Florida pilot had three distinct objectives: to “pressure test” the technology in a real-world setting, to identify
supply chain and pallet management benefits, and, most importantly, to provide evidence for future investment
decisions in RFID. As Slyster reflects:
We wanted to see if it was feasible to use RFID to track pallets through the supply chain. We
wanted to understand the benefits we could achieve internally and for our customers.
6
7

The portal design is depicted in Figure 3 in Appendix III
The final design is depicted in Figure 2 in Appendix III.
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From a technology standpoint, CHEP already knew what to expect from RFID and how to fine-tune potential flaws.
For instance, there were no products designed for mounting readers around dock doors, so CHEP engineers built a
reader stand from pipe, fastened it to the doorway, and painted it yellow. Then they mounted four RF antennas to
the pipe, two on each side. Cable was run from the antennas to a wall-mounted reader. Five dock doors, through
which pallets enter the building, and two exit doors were fitted with this setup six distribution centers. In order to
improve the durability of the tags, engineers also designed custom-made plastic cases that could withstand
pressure, water, heat, and UV radiation. While this casing increases the cost of a single tag to $1, the life span of a
tag now seemed infinite.
Discovering supply-chain benefits was a more challenging task. In order to take advantage of real-time data feeds
into the readers at different locations, the data needed to be transmitted to a networked architecture. Integration
problems quickly arose. Several applications needed to be integrated to capture, organize, and analyze the RFID
data. To capture the data, CHEP had to implement an edge application that would enable the control of all readers,
tags, and antennas. Moreover, the data needed to be integrated with the backend systems and the EPC network, in
order to be shared across the supply chain. Lastly, the data needed to be analyzed. CHEP used warehouse
management software from two vendors to manage the data at the distributor and retail level [Verisign 2004]. The
overwhelming amount of data, along with redundant reads, seriously burdened CHEP’s existing IT infrastructure.
Thus, the pilot became a trigger for developing in-house software expertise as well as upgrading the IT
infrastructure. CHEP invested $100 million in SAP enterprise resource-planning software and a state-of-the-art data
center at its Orlando, Florida, headquarters, hoping that the infrastructure would enable the company to manage
millions of small transactions each time a pallet is used, to collect the associated fees and to understand the
complex movements of its assets.
Pallet management was the most pressing problem facing CHEP. Nobody at CHEP really knew how the pallets
were flowing through the supply chain. One pallet management objective was to simplify and optimize the asset
flow. Slyster and Mendes created performance indicators that could be calculated with the data gathered through
RFID and checked daily. In 2003, the performance indicators are part of CHEP’s robust monitoring and remote
administration system, and in turn, this system was integrated with its existing legacy systems. Although Slyster
would not exactly quantify the benefits for the pallet management operation, she contended that the results were
convincing enough to launch a service offer for customers. For its RFID trial, CHEP only tracked the points of
destinations for tagged pallets, which company returned the pallets, and whether they were damaged. Tracking the
pallets originating from the 34 locations was a straightforward task, but as the system would expand and the amount
of data mushrooms, the ability to capture, organize, and analyze the data would become important for CHEP and its
customers.
After five years of a sometimes frustrating process of trial and error, CHEP had perfected a way to put RFID tags on
pallets and to ensure they can be read virtually 100 percent of the time. CHEP had worked with a RFID
manufacturer and created a tag that could be embedded in plastic and bent around the center vertical support block
in a pallet. The tag was well protected and could be read regardless of the pallet's orientation. CHEP had gained
invaluable RFID knowledge about tags, readers and the IT infrastructure needed to support them. CHEP had
shaped the industry standards for RFID deployment and a technology expertise than was unmatched both in the
supply chain or retail industry.

After the Pilot
Following the pilot, Slyster was promoted to CIO, and CHEP’s RFID program was put under the leadership of Brian
Beattie, SVP of Marketing. Puneet Sawhney was appointed as the Program Manager for RFID, and reported directly
to Brian. The leadership team decided that for CHEP’s RFID program to succeed in the current environment, it had
to be marketed to its supply-chain customers. Although the pilot was a technological success that helped CHEP to
understand its own business processes on a small scale, there was no immediate return on the $20 million
investment in the technological development. If Brian and Puneet could convince key accounts to adopt RFID and to
build the network infrastructure, CHEP could trace the product-flow of its assets. Since the CHEP business model
involved transfer of pallets when they are shipped from its service center to the manufacturers and then to the
retailers, better information sharing would be a win-win situation for all the parties, leading to real-time asset
management and control.
Around June 2003, when CHEP concluded its pilot, a major event in the industry changed the pace of RFID
adoption. Wal-Mart announced a January 2005 deadline for its top 100 suppliers to begin shipping on RFID-enabled
pallets and cases. If widespread adoption is what makes any technology successful, then the Wal-Mart
announcement would be the reason for RFID’s success in the retail supply chain. With an annual turnover of $260
billion, Wal-Mart was the largest retailer in the world and is capable of setting the agenda for retail supply chains.
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For retailers, key RFID features and the derived benefits of this technology made a compelling case. Through realtime data capture, a finer granularity of information capture and accurate information-sharing processes could be
automated that would lead to reduced labor and product-handling costs. Also, revenues could be increased through
better inventory management and the reduction of out-of-stock losses. However, despite theoretical benefits, the
reactions of both suppliers and retailers to the new technology proved difficult to gauge.

VI. MOVING FORWARD
After reviewing their clients’ current initiatives, Brian and Puneet were convinced that they had a solution that would
address both their clients’ needs and the improvement of internal operations. If the main fears of the manufacturers
were cost and lack of expertise with the technology, CHEP could provide an economical solution for the pallet
tagging. Instead of affixing a new tag to cases every time an order is shipped, it would simply read the code of
CHEP’s pallet, which then could be associated with the loaded products. In that scenario, the manufacturers would
save on variable costs and would have a small, fixed-cost investment in the readers and the connection to the backend systems. Renting the RFID-enabled pallets would be slightly more expensive, but the client's net costs would be
far less than the expense of developing their own RFID solution.
The Wal-Mart compliance requirements of the client were well aligned with the new “PLUS ID” Service. For a
surcharge of US$ 0.49 per pallet trip, clients would receive RFID-enabled pallets. With the PLUS ID program, clients
would not have to worry about installing the technology. Similar to the pallets themselves, the clients would rent a
high-quality technology that simply worked. Moreover, the PLUS ID tags would be rewriteable, enabling the clients to
store information about the products loaded onto the pallet. By taking advantage of PLUS ID, clients would be able
to improve their supply chain administration and improve their product management.
It was a story similar to that of Electronic Data Interchange and bar codes of the prior decade. The manufacturers
needed to comply with the requirements of the retailer community. However, the uneven pace of the standards
adoption forced compliance of only a limited number of their larger customers, a circumstance that demanded their
investment in infrastructure. For their part, Wal-Mart, Target, and Albertsons were open to the standards and
practices issues and seemed to accommodate to standards and processes that served both sides of the exchange.
With the PLUS ID service on the horizon, CHEP seemed poised to offer its clients—both manufacturers and
retailers—an effective approach toward aligning the strategies of the entire supply chain.
Despite the potential for higher supply chain visibility and better data analysis in the future, both manufacturers and
distributors were hesitant to adopt the PLUS ID service. 8 Given the uncertainty in the development of the technology
and the final requirements of the Wal-Mart mandate, the clients tried to minimize their initial technology investment.
The most common approach to deal with the Wal-Mart mandate was to simply attach single-use RFID tags to the
cases and ship them to Wal-Mart. The “slap-and-ship” approach, as it was called in the industry, did not require
building a reader infrastructure, which could cost up to $10.000 per portal, or integrating new middleware. The
information on the tags would never be read by the manufacturers. The manufacturers did not want to invest into
systems infrastructure until industry-wide standards for the technology were set.
While the CHEP solution was state of the art, a difference of 49 cents per pallet trip, which corresponds to an 8 to 10
percent price increase to the cost of a regular pallet trip, was significant to suppliers that already had lower margins
than their peers that did not deal with the large retail chains [Riper 2007]. Convincing manufacturers to buy a service
that promised future benefits but no immediate efficiency gains would be a hard sale to make. Moreover, the clients
argued that CHEP only wanted to recoup its initial technology investment at their expense while, at the same time,
reaping the benefits of the internal process improvements. CHEP, on the other hand, argued that the services would
only work if all the pallets were equipped with RFID, making the investment necessary.
CHEP’s RFID team faced a classical chicken-and-egg problem: CHEP could only realize the potential of RFID tags if
it generated enough critical mass, both in terms of customers and revenue, to equip fully all pallets. However, clients
were not able to make investments before the technology was proven, the infrastructure was in place or before the
benefits of the system could be realized. Beattie knew that the PLUS ID Service would only be the beginning of a
variety of value-added services as long as he could convince a few customers to carry the burden of the
infrastructure investment. Was it really too far-fetched trying to transform the company known for providing blue
pallets into a trusted logistics partner that adds value across the supply chain as a whole?

8

See “General Products” in Appendix II for an exemplary manufacturer’s take on RFID.
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CASE QUESTIONS
1. What are the costs associated with the loss and underutilization of the pallets?
2. Why would CHEP choose RFID technology to improve its operations?
3. What RFID-enabled business services should CHEP offer in the future? Can CHEP create value that
transcends its traditional value chain?
4. Should CHEP focus on its core business or should it utilize its technology expertise to become a supply
chain information provider?

APPENDIX I. STAKEHOLDERS ATTITUDE TOWARD RFID ADOPTION
Value-Rite
As one of the major retailers in the U.S., Value-Rite had revenue of $30 billion in 2003. It was looked on as an
innovator in the retail industry. With clean stores, wide aisles, and many choices, this chain still attracted a wide
variety of customers. To achieve its goal of low costs and best prices, Value-Rite had to constantly reengineer its
supply chain.
Over the last five years, Value-Rite had grown at an impressive rate of 15 percent annually. It had aggressively
challenged the competition in major markets, driving both top-line and bottom-line growth. With a major focus on
network expansion and cost reduction, its management realized that it will have to depend heavily on the latest
developments in information technology.
Value-Rite’s management felt that RFID would be a key enabler for removing redundant costs from the supply chain.
Its CIO, Tilda Limman, was excited about the benefits of this technology. She stressed that RFID will help Value-Rite
serve its customers much better:
When you shop at Value-Rite on a Saturday afternoon, there's a pretty good chance many items
aren't on the shelf anymore. Associates do their best restocking items, which is one of our biggest
challenges. We know when inventory comes into the building. We don't know exactly where and
when it needs to go from the backroom to the shelf. We have looked at this 100 times in the last 10
years. All the technology we reviewed would put restrictions on our ability to move products around
the store and out to the customers. We know the quantity, but don't have a clue where the
merchandise is. If anyone has been in the back room of a major retailer at Christmas, finding
product can be a daunting task. That really was the killer application. And we don't have to have 100
percent reads. If I miss the read to the floor, I get it coming back from the floor and then to the
compactor.
While the benefits of this technology were apparent, there were also many challenges associated with its
implementation. The biggest challenge was the lack of uniform technology standards that would enable faster
adoption at reduced cost. In order to facilitate the establishment of such standards, Value-Rite, had sponsored
EPCglobal and was closely monitoring its current developments.
As a large retailer, Value-Rite did not want its suppliers to perceive that the implementation of RFID will increase its
costs without any tangible return. Interestingly, when Value-Rite planned the business case, it believed that the
technology would work with cases and pallets and that it could justify investing in RFID. Says Tilda,
It felt similar to what happened with barcodes. In the 1980s, somebody had to take a brave step. It
was a chance to see if we could bring some companies along with us. Therefore, the biggest
challenge is to communicate effectively to its suppliers, so that they have clarity on what Value-Rite
is expecting from them. With RFID, the biggest challenge is communication—trying to keep our
suppliers less confused based on whose article they read last. You have no idea how much time
that consumes. They're calling every week, nearly every day. I spend a lot of time talking with
suppliers.
While Value-Rite feels that there are obvious benefits for all its suppliers, it is sensitive to the investments that these
companies have to make in tags and reading equipment. Therefore, it has collaborated with other key retailers to
implement a phased geographical rollout beginning January 2005, starting with the Dallas market.
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After she signed he capital expenditure for the RFID related investment for the Dallas distribution center, Tilda asked
herself, “I know this one's not going to fail. But will it play out how we've envisioned it?”

General Products
General Products Inc. was one of the largest cereal and packaged food manufacturers in the world. Headquartered
in Chicago, IL, it had business interests all over the world. With 12 production sites and 13 regional distribution
centers, General Products had a $60 billion yearly turnover.
General Products had played a key role in RFID adoption in the retail supply chain and had participated in the Auto
ID Center’s field test, as well as other industry sponsored RFID pilots. It believed that RFID will have considerable
impact in reducing the inventory costs throughout the supply chain.
Over the years, General Products has supported many industry-wide initiatives, such as EDI (Electronic Data
Interchange), VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory), and CPFR (Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and
Replenishment). While all these initiatives required a significant time commitment, few of them actually delivered the
benefits that they promised. With this discrepancy in mind, General Products supported the RFID efforts of its key
retailers with cautious optimism, especially since it required large capital investments before any returns could be
expected.
With its key retail customers driving toward “everyday low prices,” there was tremendous pressure on General
Products to reduce its costs. Any increase in packaging costs (since they are now required to put RFID tags at the
pallet and case level) would not be sustainable unless a clear ROI is proved.
To limit its risk and to ensure that existing operational processes had minimal disruption, General Products adopted
the “slap-and-ship” approach. However, the retailers argue that using this method would prevent companies from
integrating RFID technology into their business processes, thereby limiting any returns on the RFID investment.
Mark Gumm, senior director of IT, says that General Products used “slap-and-ship” because it let the company learn
about and experiment with the technology. “We prefer to call it ‘tag-at-ship’ not ‘slap-and-ship’, because it has
proven to be a very successful process," Mark said about the method, which had a 96 percent success rate for case
reads at General Products.
“It's unclear what General Products’ ROI will be after RFID implementation,” Mark says. He also worried about
application and tag cost, which was still between 20 and 60 cents per tag. "Equipment purchases could become
obsolete and we are still lacking automation and high-speed encoding," Mark said about other RFID challenges.
According to Mark, only 30 percent of General Products’ total volume goes to retailers that mandated RFID at the
case and pallet level. Unless more retailers announced similar mandates, it would be expensive for General
Products to incorporate RFID tagging into its manufacturing and operations processes.
General Products, like other key suppliers, viewed the RFID mandates as the beginning of industry-wide
experimentation. With the current read rates less than 100 percent, this technology was not deemed dependable
enough for commercial transactions. Reflecting on the future of RFID Mark says:
We currently look at this initiative as a mere cost of doing business with the key retailers. If they
want the mandates to be successful, the retailers need to share the costs as well as the benefits
that they will get in their supply chain. Unless that happens, this would be looked as another arm
twisting exercise by the mega retailers, and RFID will die a slow death.
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APPENDIX II. SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA
CHEP AMERICA (in million USD)

2006

2005

2004

2003

Sales Revenue

2956.4

2762.6

2440

2048

Operating Profit

703.8

534.4

393.6

318.5

(in million USD)

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

Pallets

2571.7

2376.2

2122.8

1761.3

1485.0

RPC

177.4

165.8

146.4

122.9

104.8

Automotive

147.8

138.2

97.6

81.9

69.9

Other

59.1

82.9

73.2

81.9

87.4

Total

2956

2763

2440

2048

1747

(in million USD)

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

Americas

1330.2

1188.1

1073.6

962.6

856.0

Europe

1241.5

1215.7

1073.6

880.6

716.3

Rest of World

384.3

359.2

292.8

204.8

174.7

Total

2956

2763

2440

2048

1747

CHEP USA

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

Size of Pallet Pool (in million)

93

87

84

80

70

ROCI (annualized )

25%

16%

10%

9%

10%

CHEP AMERICA

USA

CANADA

Latin
America

Sales Distribution

80%

10%

10%

CHEP AMERICA SALES by service

CHEP AMERICA SALES by Region

Source: Brambles 2007
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APPENDIX III. PICTORIALS OF RFID INFRASTRUCTURE

Figure 2. Application of RFID Tag to the Center Block of a Pallet
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Figure 3. Reader Portal
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PART B: CHEP: TRACKING THE PROGRESS
I. INTRODUCTION
By the end of 2003, CHEP made the decision to proceed with its RFID development. While a pool of RFID-enabled
pallets would bring benefits both to their internal operations and to their customers, it was clear that further
investment would have to come from outside of CHEP. With the initial deadline of January 2005 fast approaching,
there was hope that that the Wal-Mart mandate would increase demand for the RFID-enabled pallets, tagging the
complete pallet pool as a by product of the retail giant’s pressure. At the same time, Beattie and Sawhney
understood that they would have to quantify the both the network and the individual benefits for CHEP’s customers
in order to receive the infrastructure investments and to secure long-term contracts for the RFID-enabled pallets.

II. EXTENDED PILOTS
In order to better communicate the benefits of RFID in the supply chain, Sawhney decided to conduct broader
research on RFID studies and to set up use cases with selected partners. First he gathered information on key
benefits from previous studies. A study conducted by IBM showed that an RFID-enabled supply chain could lead to
7- 20 percent increase in labor efficiency. Studies by the Auto ID center found similar results in efficiency (3-12
percent), and also concluded that inventory cost of losses, maintenance and item returns could be reduced in the 10
and 20 percent range. While those numbers where promising indicators, the CHEP team realized that they would
have to show that their own technological solution could provide similar, if not better, results for its clients. Thus, a
new pilot study that reached across different supply chain links was designed.
Having learned from the experiences of the internal pilot the team decided on a different set up for the pilot in late
2004. First, they decided that this time around selected partners would have to partake in the pilot to share the costs
as well as to increase the credibility of the project. Specifically two major manufacturers and a large retail chain in
the Brazilian market decided to support the project. Moreover, the experiment was significantly narrower in scope
and smaller in size, with only 1000 tagged pallet moving between the 13 distribution centers of CHEP, the
manufacturers and the distributor.
Focusing mainly on the areas of shipping and receiving and information interchange, the two month pilot provided
valuable lessons and performance indicators. Most importantly, an estimate on the Return on investment (ROI)
could be made: For high priced retail items such as perfumes or razors a positive ROI could be expected in the third
year of operation whereas low margin dry goods would not yield a positive ROI until the ninth year of RFID-enabled
operation. Moreover, the experiment convinced both manufacturers to enter into long-term contracts with CHEP
USA by 2006, both sharing the cost of the tagging and paying premium prices for the use of 10,000 RFID-enabled
pallets per month.

III. WAL-MART RFID MANDATE AND COLLABORATION
Equipped with the positive results and the announcement of the two manufactures the CHEP team was confident
that more customers would agree to use RFID-enabled CHEP pallets. However, Wal-Mart delayed the deadline for
its mandate several times, reducing the pressure on its suppliers to adopt RFID-enabled solutions. Moreover, after
experimenting in their five Texas distribution centers for several years, Wal-Mart recognized in late 2006 that for
their purposes the RFID enablement of the stores should take priority over the use within the whole supply chain. An
executive stated that out of stock products had already dropped by 30 percent and the efficiency of moving products
from the backroom to shelf had increased by 60 percent. Thus the focus on the RFID mandate shifted from
delivering store information to the suppliers rather then optimizing the supply chain.
Despite the setbacks, CHEP further intensified its collaboration with Wal-Mart. In 2007, CHEP agreed to provide its
pallets free of charge to Wal-Mart, as an attempt to convince affiliated manufacturers to use (and pay for) CHEP
pallets. [Burke 2007]. Further, CHEP became an integral part of Wal-Mart’s green packaging initiative, an effort to
reduce waste associated with the packaging process. Wal-Mart, promoted the CHEP pooling model as the most
environmentally friendly packaging alternative [Brindley and Harrison 2007].

IV. INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
The success of CHEP’s pooling model did not go unnoticed. Several competitors created businesses models that
where strikingly similar to CHEP. While companies such as IGPS where unable to compete with both the size and
the network density of CHEP’s pallet pool, they would challenge CHEP with new innovative products and services.
IGPS, developed a plastic pallet that was 30 percent lighter and was projected to last 10 to 20 years longer than
CHEP’s wooden counterpart [Lacefield 2007]. Being led by a former CHEP executive and having a smaller pallet
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pool, IGPS had the foresight to equip all pallets with four RFID tags. Yet, only in late 2006 IGPS announced pilots to
test the technology, lagging behind CHEP by nearly three years. Also, with a price point of over USD 60 per pallet,
IGPS was hard fought to steadily increase its pallet pool to realize economize of scales and network effects.
CHEP reacted to the new competition by further innovating RFID technologies and by expanding the PLUS ID
service beyond the wooden pallets. Realizing that its clients would be slow to adopt into RDID reader infrastructure,
CHEP decided to accommodate older reader technologies that were already in place at most facilities. The result
was the 3-in-1 tag that was readable by RFID readers, barcode scanners and, last but not least the human eye. The
multi-mode readability enabled tracking across the entire supply chain, as long as the data was fed back into the
information system. In addition, the new tags were also rewritable, allowing customers to store specific information,
such as shipping date, or destination aside from the predetermined “license tag numbers” assigned by CHEP [CHEP
2006].

V. LOOKING AHEAD
By 2007, selected clients had opted in to the Plus ID program. RFID pallets were shipped on an on demand basis, to
customers that had agreed to pay the PLUS ID surcharge. While no exact numbers were published, it was estimated
that every month between 10,000 and 20,000 RFID-enabled pallets were issued from the CHEP service center.
While this was only a small portion of the pallet pool, it allowed CHEP to continuously tag new pallets, an effort that
essentially was paid for by the PLUS ID revenues. It would be a long way to tagging all of CHEP’s pallets but the
experiences from the pallet business were invaluable for the other lines of business.
CHEP aggressively moved into new customer segments. In late 2006 CHEP started to tag its plastic containers
[RFID Update 2006]. Tagging its plastic containers with RFID technology enabled CHEP to further expand its
pooling model to the automotive, beverage, and raw materials industries. Furthermore, CHEP also started to
markets services related to the expertise gathered in the pilot studies. Named Supply Chain Consulting, a group of
technology and supply chain experts offered their services to clients and external customers.
In the beginning of 2007 Beattie and Sawhney looked back at the last five years and realized how far they had
come. The RFID related innovation had helped CHEP maintain market leadership in the pallet business, while at the
same time fostering CHEP’s reputation as one of the most innovative companies in the supply chain business.
Moreover, the spill-over effects into other industry segments and the creation of new services were seen as a good
signs to manifest CHEP as a key player in the logistics industry. Although they not achieve the initial goal of tagging
the complete pallet pool and having the all of its customers equipped with RFID infrastructure and corresponding
data management software, they still saw a bright future for CHEP and its RFID-related business.
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